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Many conflicts throughout the world can be characterized as sovereignty conflicts 
in which two states claim exclusive sovereign rights for different reasons over the 
same piece of land. It is increasingly clear that the available remedies have been 
less than successful in many of these cases, and that a peaceful and definitive 
solution is needed. This book proposes a fair and just way of dealing with certain 
sovereignty conflicts. Drawing on the work of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, 
this book considers how distributive justice theories can be in tune with the 
concept of sovereignty and explores the possibility of a solution for sovereignty 
conflicts based on Rawlsian methodology. Jorge E. Núñez explores a solution 
of egalitarian shared sovereignty, evaluating what sorts of institutions and 
arrangements could, and would, best realize shared sovereignty, and how it might 
be applied to territory, population, government, and law.
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Preface
The idea behind this book started many, many years ago, most probably in my 
childhood back in Argentina. I could never understand why certain problems 
were not solved. Growing up I realized that the answer was very simple. Some 
problems are never solved because most look for more problems, problems within 
a problem, or just simply give up or are so self-centered they think that problem 
will not affect them and hence, why would they even think about it. Ergo, the 
answer came to me: some problems are never solved because people do not look 
for a solution.
Being originally from Argentina, and having always had interest in international 
relations and philosophy, I have always dreamt of solving the Malvinas/Falklands 
sovereignty conflict. Paradoxically, life took me to the United Kingdom. It was 
there where I had a second realization. If I am to offer a solution to that sovereignty 
conflict, why not to solve every sovereignty conflict on earth.
Being both an idealist and a pragmatist, I did know that I was not going to be 
able to put a solution to any sovereignty conflict during my lifespan. However, 
being a philosopher and a writer at heart, I decided to put my vision into an 
abstract model and that model, into words.
There were many pitfalls. The main ones had to do with the many dif- 
ferences that these sovereignty conflicts presented—from Malvinas/Falklands to 
Kashmir, Gibraltar, and even Jerusalem—and the fact that sovereignty conflicts 
are multilevel—territory, population, government, law. Moreover, I realized 
that although these sovereignty conflicts had been and were objects of study of 
many sciences—law, political sciences, international relations, to name only a few— 
these sciences did not share their developments and both different approaches and 
different languages were applied. Indeed, to my surprise I discovered that although 
multi and interdisciplinary studies are promoted in speeches everywhere, it is more 
a nominal aim rather than an actual reality.
My personal, familiar, educational, cultural, life-experience backgrounds posi-
tioned me in a privileged place to take the challenge as an objective dreamer. That 
is, I did not dare to intend to offer an actual solution to sovereignty conflicts. 
However, that did not stop me from trying to do it in the world of the ideas. 
Furthermore, the pages that follow are a very humble attempt to conduct a 
thought experiment drawing from legal sciences, political sciences, international 
xii  Sovereignty conflicts, law, and politics 
relations, and philosophy. I hope the scholars, students, and public in general see 
my point and main motivation: to offer a platform for discussion in order finally 
to be able to put all the parties in a sovereignty conflict together regardless of 
language, background, personal or group history, pride, and prejudices. Indeed, 
we may agree to disagree. That is the parties in a sovereignty conflict might agree 
to disagree, but they would at least finally be considering mutually as what they 
are: human beings able peacefully and respectfully to listen to each other, even to 
the point of disagreement.
In writing this book I have been graced with the help and comments of many. 
In a form, this book has already fulfilled its original aim since I have witnessed 
discussions around the world and I am forever indebted to the participants. 
Without any individual name, since it would be unfair to forget even one, I want 
to express my gratitude to staff, members, and students of the Universidad Nacional 
de La Plata and Colegio de Abogados de La Plata, both from Argentina; the many 
universities in the United Kingdom in which I delivered presentations and partici-
pated in discussions: Manchester, Liverpool, London School of Economics, 
Edinburgh, Durham; the State University of Saint Petersburg and the State 
University of Ivanovo, in Russia; the China University of Political Science and Law 
in Beijing; Bilkent University in Turkey; ATINER in Athens, Greece; Georgetown 
University in the United States of America; Universidad Nacional de México; and 
many others  that escape my memory at the time I write these lines.
Many thanks as well to the many reviewers the original had and the many 
discussion groups for their insightful comments in Cambridge, Oxford, and 
Edinburgh. My special thanks to the participants in Juris North discussion group, 
the one I am one of the proud founding members and chairs too.
Valuable criticism came from both legal scientists and philosophers and political 
scientists and philosophers thanks to IVR, IVR Argentina, IVR UK, and IPSA/
AISP.
Many persons from the non-scientific community participated too; that is, 
society at large. My deepest gratitude goes to them. Thanks to the comments 
received through emails, Twitter, my blog, face-to-face, formally or informally in 
Argentina, the United Kingdom, the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, Spain, México, 
Perú, China, Turkey, Russia, the United States of America, Brazil, Nigeria, 
Gibraltar, Kashmir, and Israel. These pages would have been meaningless without 
their input. For science and philosophy with any relevance to a positive impact on 
people and their lives are, for this writer, what make these pages meaningful.
Jorge E. Núñez
La Plata, Argentina
Manchester, United Kingdom
October 2016
Part I

1 Sovereignty conflicts as a 
distributive justice dilemma
A wheel within a wheel . . . is considered . . . as an absurdity in politics: But what 
must we say to two equal wheels, which govern the same political machine . . .
David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary 
(Liberty Fund, 1985), p. 370.
Introduction
It is arguably a truism in international law and politics that an ultimate sovereign, 
with a common legal bond or system of norms, will govern one territory with 
population. What would happen if that one territory and population had two 
ultimate and hierarchically equal sovereigns (legally speaking) and, at the same 
time, two valid sets of norms?1 Would it be possible, for instance, that Israel and 
Palestine had sovereign authority at the same time over Jerusalem? Would it be 
possible that Argentina and the United Kingdom were at one time sovereign over 
the territory and population of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands? If the answer were 
positive, what would the consequences be—in terms of territory, population, 
government, and law?
There are many cases that can be characterized as sovereignty conflicts in which 
international agents (namely, two sovereign states and the population of the third 
territory under dispute) claim sovereign rights for different reasons over the same 
piece of land. Besides, these conflicts have a particular feature: Their solution 
seems to require a mutually exclusive relation among the agents because it is 
thought that the sovereignty over the third territory can be granted to only one 
of them. Indeed, sovereignty is often regarded as an absolute concept—i.e. 
exclusive, and not shareable.2
1  The possibilities in the case of a joint enterprise in terms of law can be numerous (e.g. it could 
be an independent valid set of norms for that territory or a third system, it could be a 
combination of the two systems or anchored to both or just to one of the sovereign states, it 
could be the system of one of the claimants but jointly administered).
2  The concept of state sovereignty has raised and is still linked to fervent debate. For an insight 
into the discussion, see Robert Jackson (ed.), Sovereignty at the Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell 
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In light of this obsession with absolute, and rejection of shared sovereignty, 
long-standing disputes still continue to be present around the world as a zero sum 
game,3 with many negative outcomes of different sorts (e.g. social struggle, bad 
governance, inefficient exploitation of natural resources, tension in international 
relations, and threat to local and international peace). Thus, while these conflicts 
are in principle confined to specific areas and start with negative consequences 
primarily for the local population, they tend quickly to expand to the regional 
and—even—the international level (e.g. effects on international price of oil, arms 
trafficking, terrorism, war).
International relations and legal and political scholarly literature offer various 
potential remedies that one could use to solve the problem. These include 
independence, self-determination and free association—to name a few. Although 
these remedies are useful in certain conflicts, they are futile in several others. 
Hence, these conflicts remain unresolved and in a legal and political limbo.
The challenge is to present the agents with a solution that can acknowledge 
their individual claims without disregarding those of their competing parties. 
However desirable, such a solution may seem Utopian. These pages propose to 
see these conflicts from a different yet broad perspective rather than as conflicts 
between separate and independent rights.4 Therefore, the monograph examines 
the problem as a distributive justice5 issue by applying Rawlsian methodology.6 
That is because Rawlsian methodology is a particularly appropriate tool to address 
Publishers, 1999). For an eclectic view of the topic see Neil MacCormick, Questioning 
Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) and Neil MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State,” The Modern Law Review 
56 (1993): 1–18. 
3  In the context of this monograph the expression “zero sum game” refers to the situation in 
which the gain or losses of a participant in a sovereign conflict are balanced by the gain or losses 
of its peers in the dispute. Since both the rights and burdens of the sovereign states over the 
third territory are still under discussion, they cannot actually put them into practice (at least 
fully) which translates into both sovereign states not being able actually to make use of their 
intended rights over the third territory.
4  Sovereignty can be seen as both: (a) a whole: a single right or prerogative to govern a given 
piece of land (territory), its respective population and to create and apply law to them; 
(b) individual rights: many divisible sub-rights depending on the subject matter (territory, 
population, government, and law). For the purpose of this project, to see sovereignty as a 
totality or a whole group of rights or these same rights in their individuality does not affect its 
essence. The fact that these rights can be shared among several international subjects and the 
way to do it is, in contrast, what defines this research. For an extensive analysis of the concept 
of sovereignty see Harold J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1921); John Hoffman, Sovereignty (Open University Press, 
1998); and many others.
5  Distributive justice issues are those concerned with the allocation of benefits and burdens in 
relation to wealth and income. See John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1996); Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice 
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2004); and many others.
6  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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sovereignty issues, just as it has previously been applied in assigning rights and 
obligations in other social institutions.7 As a consequence, reviewing different 
theories (e.g. “first come, first served”; just acquisition; the principle of equality) 
may help to resolve the problem. The aim is to explore if a solution that certainly 
is desirable can also be attained and may offer a peaceful way of solving sovereignty 
conflicts through the use of principles of distributive justice.
General structure
To evaluate the potential for using principles of distributive justice to resolve 
certain kinds of sovereignty conflicts, the monograph is divided into three parts. 
Part I—i.e. Chapters 1 and 2—includes discussion on two preliminary potential 
pitfalls to this project that is the use of Rawlsian methodology and the use of the 
concept of “sovereignty.” Chapter 1, the Introduction, presents some simplifying 
assumptions and the basic elements that constitute this study and in particular 
goes through the critical discussion on Rawls’s methodology in order to justify its 
application here. Chapter 2 will address a key task in developing the new approach: 
To examine if the concept of “sovereignty,” which is assumed by many to be 
absolute, can be (and in fact, actually is) limited. This chapter follows two lines of 
analysis: (a) conceptual; and (b) historical.
Part II—i.e. Chapters 3, 4, and 5—introduces and explores the current state of 
affairs in international law and politics in terms of conceptual elements and 
potential remedies to sovereignty conflicts. Chapter 3 will focus on assessing the 
need for a revised “shared sovereignty.” This and similar expressions have been 
used in the political and legal literature before. However, its meaning remains 
tangled, with specific real cases or national and international agendas making it 
difficult to be applied to different realities. It is for that reason this chapter will 
review different ways in which this concept (in various versions or conceptions) 
and similar ones have been previously applied in legal and political scholarly 
literature.
Chapter 4 will examine self-ownership8 as a way to define sovereignty. More 
precisely, if it can be established that sovereignty may in theory be limited and the 
need of a revised “shared sovereignty” the next step will be to evaluate how 
sovereignty can be shared—i.e. how a state can limit itself by sharing its rights and 
obligations and still remain sovereign. Therein, this chapter will assess the concept 
of “sovereignty” in parallel with the concept of “self-ownership.” That is because 
by using an analogous concept such as self-ownership that implies supreme 
7  Ibid., p. 4.
8  The term “self-ownership” will be used with its full content and will be applied directly in this 
monograph, not as a metaphor but as a way to understand how both concepts (sovereignty 
and self-ownership) are similar, being one of these similarities the fact that both can embrace 
shared paradigms. See Gerald Allan Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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authority but yet accepts limitations it becomes clearer how limitations can work 
in another supposedly supreme concept such as sovereignty. Chapter 5 highlights 
the main remedies applied at international level to sovereignty conflicts and will 
explore each in order to determine whether any of them could be a reasonable 
solution to the sovereignty conflicts object of this project. What this chapter will 
argue is that there is a need for a reasonable solution that the reviewed international 
remedies cannot offer.
Part III—i.e. Chapters 6, 7, and 8—will explore the use of Rawlsian methodo- 
logy in order to put a solution to certain sovereign conflicts, and discuss if the 
outcome is a reasonable remedy for them. Chapter 6 will introduce and explore: 
(a) the conditions for achieving justice—toleration, peace, etc.; (b) why the “just 
acquisition” principle9 may not work; and (c) why the Rawlsian method of con-
ceiving of the respective claimants as behind a “veil of ignorance”10 just might. 
The latter is of utmost importance as the analysis will be conducted under these 
circumstances; that is, in an original position in which the three representatives 
will be in a particular situation, both in regard to their particular circumstances 
and that of the original position itself.
Chapter 7 will test the proposed model by working out what sorts of institutions 
and arrangements could, and would best, realize it. In order to do that this chapter 
will make use of some sovereign conflicts to show that the model can be extended 
from the general principles to workable institutions that realize those principles 
in: (a) population; (b) territory; (c) government and law; and (d) all that they 
imply (e.g. defense, natural resources, financial system). Finally, Chapter 8 will 
conclude by assessing the model’s potential and highlighting any possible 
limitations and implications.
Simplifying assumptions: Sovereignty conflicts of  
various natures
At first glance, the international scene presents several sovereignty conflicts of very 
different types; to name a few: Falkland/Malvinas Islands (Argentina and the 
United Kingdom), Jerusalem and other surrounding areas (Israel and Palestine), 
Gibraltar (Spain and the United Kingdom), Kashmir (India and Pakistan), Cyprus 
(Greek Cyprus and Turkish Republic of North Cyprus), Transnistria (Trans-
Dniester or Transdniestria and Moldova), Quebec (Quebec and Canada), Kuril 
Islands (Japan and Russia), Tibet (and China), Hong Kong (and China), Northern 
Ireland (the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom), South Ossetia 
(and Georgia), Abkhazia (and Georgia), Nagorno-Karabakh (and Azerbaijan).
 9  Robert Nozick’s notion, developed in Anarchy, State and Utopia, which will be clarified and 
applied in subsequent sections.
10  John Rawls’s idea of the original position, mainly developed in Theory of Justice (also, to some 
extent, in Justice as Fairness and Political Liberalism). Details of its application will be 
discussed in subsequent sections.
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Although all the above international disputes are interesting in their own way, 
in order to be sure the outcome of this project will generalize, some simplifying 
assumptions are introduced. The main reason is to leave aside conflicts in which 
not only the sovereignty over a third territory is disputed but also basic notions 
such as statehood are still discussed. That is to say, if statehood is feasible that is 
what may happen. But this project assumes that statehood (for whatever reason) 
is not possible. Consequently, because of the scope of this monograph, it is more 
useful to analyze in depth international differences in which the basic elements 
that form state sovereignty are settled rather than to make a comprehensive study 
of cases in very different stages, which would have only an outline. Besides, the 
conclusions may be applied to a wide range of conflicts by method of analogy. 
With these reasons in mind, two clarifications should be made at this point in 
order to define the object of this project.
In the first instance, it is true that although these cases have in common a 
sovereignty issue they have their own peculiarities:
(a) Some states are fully sovereign both de jure and de facto (e.g. Argentina, the 
United Kingdom, China, etc.).
(b) Some states are only de facto sovereign (e.g. Palestine—which in fact still has 
only partial local autonomy, Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, etc.).
(c) Others have already solved the conflicts or are approaching an integration 
process into a larger legal order (e.g. Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, etc.).
(d) A few cases are difficult to define as belonging to any of the previous 
categories. They possess most of the elements that could potentially 
grant their statehood but there is no foreseeable evidence this will happen 
(e.g. Tibet).
Following the previous categorization the focus will be only on disputes concerning 
two fully sovereign states (both de jure and de facto) over a third populated 
territory.
Furthermore, two groups can be identified, using another classification 
criterion:
(a) One in which there are two sovereign states (de jure and de facto) disputing 
their rights over a third territory and its population;
(b) One in which there are two states, one sovereign de jure and de facto, and 
the other one having only de facto sovereignty over the territory under 
dispute.
For the purpose of this analysis, only the first set of cases will be of interest.
So this book will deal with disputes between two sovereign states (de jure 
and de facto) over the sovereignty of a populated nonsovereign third territory 
(e.g. Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Gibraltar, Kashmir, and the Kuril Islands). That 
is not to say the analysis will not generalize to other disputes. In other words, 
although practical reasons make it impossible to include every single sovereignty 
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conflict in the analysis—even if they were only seen theoretically, the principles 
that will be reached may be generalized in order to be applicable to cases left aside 
or simply not considered here.
Rawlsian methodology
The model proposed in this monograph is constructed using many theoretical 
elements. However, the core proposal will be based on Rawlsian methodology—
i.e. not his theory. Therein, two main issues must be addressed before advancing 
this project, mainly in order to avoid tangential criticism that may have to do with 
elements foreign to this work. First, the tension between ideal and nonideal or 
realist theory in the conception of distributive justice insofar applied in this project 
as the obligations and duties associated with sovereignty are now interwoven with 
moral issues. Second, the arguably problematic application of Rawlsian methodo- 
logy, in particular the original position and the veil of ignorance, in a critical enough 
manner, and its extension to the international level.
In what has to do with the existent and evolving tension between ideal and 
nonideal theory, this monograph is circumscribed to claims about ideal moral 
theorising only, and therefore, does not include claims about practical application. 
It uses the Rawlsian method to determine how states should conceive the issue as 
a matter of first principle, and does not claim to do more than this. To be more 
precise, this monograph is in effect an exercise in ideal theory, and does not claim 
it has applicability as a nonideal theory or really explores the relevant nonideal 
issues—e.g. lack of compliance. It follows that to discuss the practical usefulness 
of this project or whether this theorization of a problem in international law and 
politics may bring actual results and create rights and obligations for the agents11 
is irrelevant—i.e. contra negantem principia non est disputandum.
It is Rawlsian methodology that will be applied in order to explore a reasonable 
remedy to some sovereignty conflicts. That is to say that these pages and the 
outcome may agree with Rawls’s theory as a whole and its outcome but does not 
need to. Nevertheless, even though this monograph will only make use of Rawlsian 
methodology—i.e. not Rawls’s theory—it must be acknowledged that it will not 
be exempt from controversy and criticism. Because of the arguably very problematic 
application of Rawls methodology, it is necessary to consider the challenges to this 
idealism via this already existent criticism in scholarly literature. Thus, not only may 
the criticism refer to Rawlsian methodology but also to its application at international 
level. Indeed, there has been much critical discussion of these issues—e.g. Beitz, 
Pogge, Kuper, Caney, Buchanan, Reidy, Martin, and Reidy. Therein, in order 
to develop the model proposed in this monograph and devise its own angle or 
justification for applying Rawlsian methodology and extending it to a particular 
11  Ronald Dworkin, “Justice and Rights,” In: Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1977). 
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issue at international level such as sovereignty conflicts, there are some critical 
points to be noted by working through a hefty literature for that matter.
On the one hand, with regard to Rawlsian methodology, as in A Theory of 
Justice the model here is based on a hypothetical situation.12 Hence, this original 
position in which the negotiations take place assumes certain features. Indeed, the 
content of the original position is something constructed to reflect what is thought 
to be morally relevant. Similar to what Rawls does at the individual level, the 
characteristics of the original position will be determined in order to avoid any 
possible interference from factors that can cause bias and that may lead to a partly 
unjust or unfair outcome. A redefined “veil of ignorance”13 will be applied at 
international level in order to address sovereignty conflicts. Many criticisms have 
been presented against Rawls’s original position and veil of ignorance:
(a) The moral point of view.
(b) The social contract doctrine.
(c) The choice in the original position is indeterminate.
The moral point of view is not of Rawlsian exclusive or original application. 
Hume’s “judicious spectator,” Smith’s “impartial spectator,” Kant’s categorical 
imperative, Rousseau’s general will, Sidgwick’s “point of view of the universe” are 
among several examples in which the moral point of view is taken into account in 
order to assess a given situation.14 It is indeed a mistake to confuse moral 
justification with democratic political legitimacy, the latter not claimed by or 
argued for in this project.15 The main reason behind this choice has previously 
been—and it is in this project too—to secure impartial judgment once agents 
leave aside their interests and evaluate a given situation from what is assumed to 
be an impartial point of view.16 Hence, this monograph will explore if it is possible 
12  For complete details about the hypothetical agreement, original position, veil of ignorance, 
and the negotiations see Chapter 6.
13  Rawls mainly develops the veil of ignorance in his A Theory of Justice but it is also present in 
his Justice as Fairness, A Restatement and Political Liberalism.
14  Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Samuel Freeman, “Reason and Agreement in Social Contract 
Views,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 122–57; Samuel Freeman, Justice and the 
Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007); Simon Caney, Justice Beyond 
Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), esp. p. 54.
15  Andrew Kuper, “Why Deliberation Cannot Tame Globalization: The Impossibility of 
a Deliberative Democrat,” Analyse and Kritik 25 (2003): 176–98, esp. p. 192, fn. 35.
16  For a better understanding on Rawls’s methodology see Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life 
and His Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 42–59, 63–64, 
and 66; Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (eds.), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 579–85; Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (ed.), A 
Companion to Rawls (Wiley Blackwell, 2014), Part II; Samuel Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 139–67.
10  Sovereignty conflicts, law, and politics 
to adapt the model created by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice to sovereignty 
conflicts. Therefore, this is a theoretical exercise to focus on what factors cause 
bias in sovereignty disputes. Then, the task is to design a procedure that will limit 
the effect of these factors. It is important to clarify that the moral significance of 
this kind of hypothetical agreement varies with the subject matter to which this 
ideal platform is applied. Rawls’s subject matter is different from the one analyzed 
here and hence, both the hypothetical agreements and their moral significance 
will be different.17
With regard to the social contract doctrine, many thinkers other than Rawls 
have applied it too. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant are just a few obvious 
examples.18 The basis of this project has to do with an agreement among two 
already sovereign states and a third nonsovereign populated territory in order to 
enter into negotiations about the sovereignty of the disputed third territory. 
Therefore, the use of a social contract has to do with the very nature of the 
negotiations and issues this project will deal with. Furthermore, it has to do with 
the nature of international relations as a whole. To be more precise, in the case of 
any conflict in international relations, if a peaceful and long-lasting solution is the 
desired outcome, agents should not be imposed policies but invited to discuss 
them. Indeed, international law and politics recognize the principle of equality as 
core in the interrelation, at least, among agents that are sovereign. This project 
follows that notion too and takes a stance on nondomination.19
It may be the case that Rawls’s own original position is indeterminate.20 
Moreover, it may be discussed whether it is possible at all to make a rational choice 
without knowing primary ends, or fundamental values and commitments.21 That 
discussion is irrelevant here because the agents and the way in which the original 
position and the veil of ignorance are characterized in this project are different 
from the ones presented in A Theory of Justice. In fact, the representatives of these 
agents in the negotiations will have access to the information relevant to the 
sovereignty conflict at hand, everyone’s desires, interests, and purposes as well 
as factual and historical data.22
On the other hand, another potential controversial point in this project may 
have to do with the extension of Rawlsian methodology to the international arena. 
It is important to make it clear to the reader from the outset that A Theory of 
17  Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and His Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), esp. pp. 60 ff.
18  Ibid.
19  For the discussion on nondomination see Chapter 4.
20  Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
21  Alaistair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame Press: 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
22  For more details about the information available to the representatives of the agents in the 
negotiations and limitations see Chapter 6.
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Justice23 is very different from The Law of Peoples24 and, in many ways, constitutes 
a problematic25—albeit not implausible—extension to the international level.26 
Rawls’s extension of his theory to the international arena has received criticism. 
It is to be expected that to extend Rawlsian methodology to an international issue 
such as sovereignty conflicts will be target of at least these criticisms too.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls provides some indications of how his general 
principles for Justice as Fairness, might find a use in international law, and The Law 
of Peoples is presented as a development of these tendencies. However, The Law of 
Peoples is also presented as a part of the program for Political Liberalism—i.e. 
principles that should guide foreign policy for a liberal people. If The Law of 
Peoples is identified as a component in some form of Political Liberalism while 
Rawls’s early discussion of international law finds itself within a more comprehensive 
liberal perspective, and if these are two discussions, it is important to make clear 
how this monograph will reconcile these two perspectives or whether it will settle 
on one over the other or a hybrid—and, if so—along which tangent.
The answer is simple. Indeed, Rawls’s thinking on international justice can be 
found in The Law of Peoples whether as a development of the tendencies from 
A Theory of Justice in the international arena or as part of a program for Political 
Liberalism. This project will explore some of its elements too. However, it is 
A Theory of Justice and in particular the method Rawls develops there that will 
be used here. Put it in different terms, Rawls presented a different model in 
23  John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement and The Law of Peoples 
will be also discussed in this monograph.
24  John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999).
25  For a detailed account on the reception of Rawls’s view on international justice and relevant 
criticism see David A. Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice,” Political Theory 32 (2004): 
291–319, esp. fn. 2. See also Thomas W. Pogge, “The Incoherence Between Rawls’s Theories 
of Justice,” Fordham Law Review 72 (2004): 1739–59; Thomas W. Pogge, “Do Rawls’s Two 
Theories of Justice Fit Together?” in Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Thomas W. Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. Chapter 6, 
pp. 240–46; Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 10 (2002): 95–123; Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), esp. p. 100, fn. 43 and pp. 125–31; Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy 
(eds.), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
pp. 411–16; Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic 
Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), esp. pp. 6–9; Alex Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law 
of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World,” Ethics 110 (2000): 697–721.
26  For a view on Rawls and international distributive justice see Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory 
and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), esp. Part III, 
pp. 129–36; Thomas W. Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 23 (1994): 195–224; Thomas W. Pogge, “Rawls on International Justice,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 246–53; Andrew Kuper, “Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond 
the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of Persons,” Political Theory 28 (2000): 640–74, 
esp. pp. 641–45; Andrew Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in 
Global Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 7–14. 
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The Law of Peoples. This monograph does not claim that its outcome is the one 
Rawls would necessarily come up with. It is using his methodology to arrive at its 
own solution in order to explore a way in which sovereignty conflicts may be 
solved. Therein, neither this project is a development of A Theory of Justice nor 
Political Liberalism.
By way of example, Rawls makes clear in The Law of Peoples that it is “peoples” 
that take the place of persons.27 He makes it explicit that not persons but peoples 
are the units of representation.28 From there, The Law of Peoples introduces 
not one but two original positions.29 Rawls goes further and leaves no doubts that 
sovereignty is not central for his proposal.30 This monograph, on the contrary, 
follows the traditional view that states are constituted by a population (“peoples”) 
and also recognizes territory, government, and law as constitutive elements, and 
sovereignty as an attribute. That is because this monograph is centered on 
sovereignty disputes, issues that Rawls himself does not address.
There are many other points that have been raised directly or indirectly related 
to Rawls’s work: The general conflict between cosmopolitan ideals and national 
sentiment,31 whether there is a need for a conception of international distributive 
justice,32 social versus cosmopolitan liberalism,33 the moral standing of states,34 
27  Charles R. Beitz, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent 
Thought,” World Politics 51 (1999): 269–96, esp. pp. 273–76; Thomas W. Pogge, 
“An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994): 195–224, esp. 
pp. 197–98.
28  Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110 (2000): 669–96; Thomas W. Pogge, 
“Do Rawls’s Two Theories of Justice Fit Together,” In: Rex Martin and David A. Reidy 
(eds.), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).
29  Charles R. Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics 110 (2000): 669–96, esp. p. 674.
30  Rawls specifically uses in The Law of Peoples (1999) the term “peoples” and maintains that 
“peoples” lack traditional sovereignty. This monograph, on the contrary, uses the terms 
“state” and “sovereignty” as generally accepted in legal and political sciences. See Chapter 2 
for more details about sovereignty and state sovereignty and Chapter 6 for further discussion 
and analysis of The Law of Peoples. See also Andrew Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice 
and Representation in Global Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), esp. 
p. 13.
31  Charles R. Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,” The Journal of Philosophy 
80 (1983): 591–600. 
32  Charles R. Beitz, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent 
Thought,” World Politics 51 (1999): 269–96; Charles R. Beitz, “Recent International 
Thought,” International Journal (1988): 183–204; Thomas W. Pogge (ed.), Global Justice 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), for example pp. 15, 59, 62; Simon Caney, “Global 
Interdependence and Distributive Justice,” Review of International Studies 31 (2005): 
389–99.
33  Charles R. Beitz, “Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism,” International Affairs 75 (1999): 
515–29.
34  Charles R. Beitz, “The Moral Standing of States Revisited,” Ethics and International Affairs 
(2010): 325–47.
Sovereignty and distributive justice  13
international justice and self-sufficiency of “nation-states”,35 problems about 
natural resources,36 the empirical foundation of national self-sufficiency,37 cosmo-
politanism and sovereignty,38 global distributive justice and the normative 
significance of the state,39 theories of justice and representation for global 
institutions,40 distinct approaches to international distributive justice,41 and 
whether a global principle of equality of opportunity is defendable.42 Arguably 
directly or indirectly pertinent to Rawls’s theory and its application, the previously 
mentioned points have little to do with the present project and to include them 
either in the analysis or its criticism is a misinterpretation of this work. For dis-
tributive justice principles by application of Rawlsian methodology are brought 
into this project only to offer a solution to sovereignty conflicts, and not to put 
an end to inequalities among the claiming agents’ comparative situations or to 
bring about a solution of global distributive justice nature. This book, although 
seeking for a just and fair outcome, is not about global justice or morality but 
about particular sovereignty conflicts—i.e. those with two sovereign states claim-
ing sovereignty over a populated third territory. That is to say, the model here will 
make use of distributive justice principles by application of Rawlsian methodology 
in order to explore a potential remedy to some sovereignty conflicts. Ergo, the 
model does not intend to use sovereignty conflicts as an example of global 
distributive justice.
Conclusion
The present chapter had a Janus-faced intertwined aim. First, to introduce the 
core idea behind the project: To explore how distributive justice principles by 
application of Rawlsian methodology may help in finding a remedy to at least 
some sovereignty conflicts—i.e. the ones with two sovereign states claiming 
sovereignty over a populated third territory. Second, to acknowledge some 
potential preliminary criticisms that may have to do more with the Rawlsian 
theory than with the present work in order to avoid possible misunderstandings 
with regard to the methodology used here and the nature of this project.
35  Charles R. Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
4 (1975): 360–89.
36  Ibid.
37  Ibid.
38  Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics 103 (1992): 48–75.
39  Simon Caney, “Global Distributive Justice and the State,” Political Studies 56 (2008): 
487–518.
40  Andrew Kuper, Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
41  Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 3–15; 
Simon Caney, “International Distributive Justice,” Political Studies 49 (2001): 974–97.
42  Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities,” Metaphilosophy 
32 (2001): 113–34.
14  Sovereignty conflicts, law, and politics 
The following chapters will introduce and assess many conceptual elements 
and theories pertinent to law, political sciences, and international relations in 
the context of certain kinds of sovereignty conflicts and defend the conclusion 
that principles of just distribution provide a reasonable remedy to at least some of 
them. This reasonable remedy lies in viewing sovereignty conflicts as a problem 
of distributive justice. The first steps of this path start with the next chapter by 
considering the first of these issues that is limited sovereignty.
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